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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis empirically investigates the United Kingdom (UK) insolvency code by 
focusing on the formal procedures available to distressed firms in the UK. The UK 
insolvency code is characterised as a creditor-oriented system that enforces a binding 
agreement between the company and the creditors with a view to maximising payouts 
to the creditors. However, the government has introduced two major legislative 
changes – the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Enterprise Act 2002 – to move the UK 
insolvency code away from its creditor-orientation and towards a system that will 
increase the chances of distressed, but viable, firms in the UK to reorganise. 
 
The introduction of the Insolvency Act 1986 paved the way for distressed companies 
in the UK to enter into a formal procedure (administration) specifically introduced as 
a means of encouraging a culture of reorganisation for distressed firms in the UK. 
This thesis investigates the functioning of the UK code, by focusing on the two main 
formal procedures available to distressed firms (administration and administrative 
receivership) after the introduction of the 1986 Act. The introduction of the Enterprise 
Act 2002 resulted to the abolition of the administrative receivership procedure while 
maintaining the administration procedure as the key formal rescue procedure in the 
UK insolvency code. Hence, conducting research in the UK formal insolvency 
procedure is important as it provides empirical evidence on the administration 
procedure, which is now the main rescue vehicle under the Enterprise Act 2002. The 
thesis focuses on the post-1986 regime in the UK. It consists of 8 chapters including 3 
empirical chapters.  
    
 
Chapter 5 examines a large sample of UK firms that initiated administration or 
administrative receivership procedures between 1996 and 2001. The aim is to 
investigate the choice of the resolution form between administration and 
administrative receivership. The main research question is to investigate whether the 
newly introduced administration procedure catered for firms with a different set of 
financial and other characteristics to those that entered administrative receivership. 
The findings show that there are some distinguishing characteristics between firms 
entering administration and those entering administrative receivership, implying that 
administrative receivership was not necessarily the most appropriate insolvency 
procedure for all distressed firms.  
 
 
Chapter 6 examines a sample of UK firms that entered administration between 1996 
and 2001. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the differences between firms that 
reorganised in administration versus those that liquidate. The key issue here is 
whether administration procedure can differentiate between firms potentially likely to 
survive and those likely to fail. The findings show that there are significant 
differences between firms that reorganise and those that fail in administration, 
suggesting that the administration procedure is able to discriminate between viable 
and non-viable firms.   
 
 
 xiii 
Chapter 7 examines the subsequent performance of UK firms that reorganised in 
administration between 1996 and 2001 relative to a matched sample firms from the 
same industry and of relatively the same size. The aim was to assess the subsequent 
performance of companies that reorganise in administration using several key ratios, 
covering the period from two years prior to failure until three years afterwards. The 
results show significant improvements in the financial performance of reorganised 
firms, relative to a matched sample firms, during the period after entering 
administration.  
 
 
In summary, these results show the importance of introducing the administration 
procedure in the Insolvency Act 1986. Prior to this date, there was the possibility that 
some of those firms that reorganised in administration post-1986 might have been 
liquidated as there was no formal procedure aiming to reorganise distressed firms at 
that time. The findings clearly show the potential of the administration procedure in 
attracting distressed firms capable of reorganising. That procedure has now become 
the foundation upon which the UK insolvency code is built as indicated by the 
Enterprise Act 2002. However, having said that, the 1986 system also opened the way 
for severely distressed companies that should have been liquidated speedily in 
administrative receivership to attempt reorganisation in administration, thus wasting 
those firms’ already severely depleted resources further. In my opinion, the Enterprise 
Act 2002 should safeguard against this by putting in place procedures to prevent 
economically distressed companies from attempting to reorganise in administration.   
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